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This article interrogates the concepts in this journal’s title and, drawing on the 
strategic-relational approach in social theory, explores their interconnections. This 
conceptual re-articulation is then contextualized in regard to the European Union as a 
political regime that serves as a real-time laboratory for experiments in government 
and governance with implications for redesigning polities, politics, and policies, 
especially in response to symptoms of political and policy failures and other crises. 
Mobilizing the territory-place-network-scale schema, and drawing on critical 
governance studies, this article offers an alternative account of these developments 
based on (1) their sociospatial and temporal complexities, (2) recognition that socio-
spatial relations are objects and means of government and governance and not just 
sites where such practices occur, and (3) extension of this approach to multispatial 
meta-governance, i.e., attempts to govern the government and governance of socio-
spatial relations. The article ends with suggestions for future research on the state and 
state power, governance of the European Union, and the role of Territory, Politics, 





Territory, Politics, Governance and Multispatial Metagovernance 
Bob Jessop 
 
This article addresses some theoretical and empirical connections among the terms, 
Territory, Politics, Governance, in the light of the strategic-relational approach to 
structure-agency dialectics as developed in sociology and political science and applied 
by some geographers. In the inaugural issue, its editor described the journal’s remit 
as ‘territorial politics, spaces of governance, and the political organization of space’ 
(AGNEW 2013, p. 1). Yet, on my reading, these three themes are rarely investigated 
together in TPG and their mutual implications are neglected. I suggest ways to remedy 
these deficits below. First, for territorial politics, I supplement the Continental European 
traditions of general state theory and classical geopolitics by noting the non-territorial 
aspects of state power and adding the role of state projects and political imaginaries. 
Second, I consider the kind of politics, whether territorial or non-territorial, at stake in 
these areas. Specifically, I use the polity, politics, and policy triplet to explore how state 
power reorders the polity, which is the strategically-selective terrain on which politics 
occurs as well as a crucial site for contesting policies. Third, for governance, inspired 
by Antonio GRAMSCI (1975) and Michel FOUCAULT (2007, 2008), I redefine state 
power as ‘government + governance in the shadow of hierarchy’. The conjunction of 
the first two terms in this redefinition signifies that spaces of governance are not 
exclusively territorial and reference to hierarchy indicates the key role of state power 
in metagovernance, that is, the governance of governance. This has various forms, 
including, notably, what, after Andrew DUNSIRE (1996), I term collibration. 
 
In developing these arguments and exploring their interconnections, I suggest that the 
socio-spatial arrangements of the state and state power (as redefined above) involve 
more than the capacity to territorialize, and hence to ‘contain’, political authority and 
thereby define the terrain within which state powers are exercised and from and 
among which inter-state relations are conducted. For the ‘political organization of 
space’ is by no means confined to territory but extends, almost by definition, to all 
dimensions of sociospatial relations. This points not only beyond ‘territorial politics’ to 
the complex politics of place, scale, and networks considered individually but also to 
their variable articulation with territory in sociospatial imaginaries, spatial strategies, 
and spatiotemporal fixes (see LEFEBVRE, 1991, 2009; BRENNER and ELDEN, 
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2009). In short, several sociospatial dimensions can serve as ‘spaces of governance’ 
and be targeted as an object of spatial strategies and/or mobilized as the medium 
through which these strategies are pursued. I relate these arguments to the socio-
spatio-temporal dynamics of the European Union as a still emerging state or state-like 
body in a continuing and contested process of formation as well as an important site 
for experimentation with forms of governance. Specifically, I revisit accounts of 
multilevel government and multilevel governance in the EU and argue that ‘multispatial 
metagovernance’ would provide a better heuristic and guide to the search for solutions 
to the current economic and political crisis. A further dimension is added by introducing 
the concepts of institutional and spatio-temporal fixes as crucial aspects of governance 
and metagovernance. I conclude with comments for future research on these topics. 
 
The Terrestrial, the Territorial and Statehood 
 
Space comprises socially produced grids and horizons of social action that divide and 
organize the material, social, and imaginary world(s) and also orient actions in the light 
of such divisions. Space can be a site, object, and means of governance and, in terms 
of orienting action, is associated with various spatial imaginaries. First, inherited 
spatial configurations and their opportunity structures are sites where governance may 
be established, contested, and modified. Second, it is an object of governance insofar 
as it results from the fixing, manipulation, reordering, and lifting of material, social, and 
symbolic borders, boundaries, frontiers, and liminal spaces. These arrangements are 
not limited to those established through territorialization. Third, space can be a means 
of governance when it defines horizons of action in terms of ‘inside’, ‘outside’, ‘cross’, 
and ‘liminal’ spaces and when it configures possible connections among actors, 
actions, and events via various spatio-temporal technologies. And, fourth, because no 
actors can grasp geo-socio-spatial relations in all their complexity, this forces them to 
view space through spatial imaginaries that frame their understandings, orientations, 
directly spatial projects, or other projects with spatial aspects (on enforced sense- and 
meaning-making as a condition of going on in the world, SUM and JESSOP, 2013). 
 
One form of organizing space is territorialization. In analysing states and state power 
as well as empires and imperial governance, it is crucial to distinguish territory from 
the wider, generic notion of terra or the terrestrial. The latter encompasses ‘land’ in its 
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broadest sense, i.e., land and the subterranean, the sea, its depths and seabed, the 
air above, and, where relevant, outer space, and, as such, it provides the variable 
geophysical and socially appropriated ‘raw material’ or substratum for territorialization 
as one mode of organizing space, politically or otherwise. Among other spatial turns, 
a recent one is the ‘return to earth’ (CLARK, 2011: ix), including the resurgence of 
geopolitics (DEPLEDGE, 2015). As it gets appropriated and altered through 
territorialization, the landmass is divided into more or less clearly delimited areas 
governed by a political authority (especially a state, see below) that can make binding 
decisions on their residents and defend its sovereignty against internal and external 
threats (DELANEY, 2005; WEBER, 1978). This kind of demarcation does not generally 
apply to the ‘high seas’ that lie beyond territorial waters and this, in turn, affects 
maritime flows of goods, technologies, people, ideas and other transformative forces. 
Both kinds of organization of space are nonetheless contested and may lead to 
alternating or conjoint processes of de- and re-territorialization, cycles of state and 
empire formation, or the co-existence and even intermeshing of maritime and land 
empires, with variable implications for the state as a ‘power container’ or connector. 
 
Land without centralized political authority is sometimes termed terra nullius – that is, 
land without a sovereign (the Antarctic land-mass is a rare current example); its 
maritime parallel, as noted, is ‘the high seas’ (on the contrasting political dynamics of 
land and sea, see SCHMITT, 1997; DERMAN, 2011; MÜNKLER, 2007; PHILLIPS and 
SHARMAN, 2015). This raw material shapes claims to sovereignty (contrast, for 
example, continental and archipelagic states), underpins different kinds of territorial 
organization and political imaginaries and strategies (on the social construction of the 
ocean, see STEINBERG, 2010), prompts different kinds of territorial dispute (e.g., 
navigation rights through straits), influences the variegated forms of land-based and 
maritime empires, and shapes the evolution of international law (MOUNTZ, 2013, 
2015). The distinction between territorial rule and space of flows is more relevant to 
early stages of land and sea empires than it is at their peak. For MÜNKLER, ‘the former 
arose through a consolidation of the spaces under rule, whereas the latter expanded 
by making their trade relations both more intensive and more extensive’ (2007, p. 48). 
 
The territorial organization of political authority is the essential feature of premodern 
as well as modern statehood (e.g. LUHMANN, 1989). It has different forms, rests on 
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specific political and calculative technologies that support territorialization, and can be 
combined with other forms of political authority and broader patterns of spatial 
organization, resulting in different kinds of state and polity (ELDEN, 2010). We can 
relate this to Continental European constitutional, juridical, and state theory (for 
example, JELLINEK, 1905; HELLER, 1983). These traditions identify three 
components of the state: (1) a politically organized coercive, administrative, and 
symbolic apparatus endowed with both general and specific powers; (2) a clearly 
demarcated core territory under more or less uncontested and continuous control of 
the state apparatus; and, equally important, (3) a permanent or stable population, on 
which the state’s political authority and decisions are binding. For modern states, this 
implies that no state should be formally subordinate to external authority: it should be 
sovereign in its territory and over its own population. To this one can add a fourth 
component: (4) the state idea, i.e., political imaginaries that provide a reference point 
for efforts to integrate the state and define the nature and purposes of the state for the 
wider society in specific types of state, regime or conjuncture (JESSOP, 2015; cf. 
MACLEAVY and HARRISON, 2010). Inter alia, these imaginaries and associated state 
projects typically include significant socio-spatial features and aspirations. 
 
Many forms of political authority that predate the modern state fit the three-component 
definition, starting with groups of hunter-gatherers or herders that tend to roam within 
a space that has porous borders but also crucial nodes (such as oases, ritual sites) 
that these groups seek to defend; and then developing through simple and complex 
chiefdoms to early forms of state and empire, where nomadic empires may co-exist 
with sedentary ones (MÜNKLER, 2007; VAN DER PIJL, 2007; CUNLIFFE, 2015). 
 
Chiefdoms and states often formed networks based on competitive alliances and, in 
the case of states, these sometimes crystallized into a single political unit, which 
incorporated several states and polities to form land-based ‘empires’ ruling larger 
areas and bigger populations (EISENSTADT, 1963; FINER, 1997b; MÜNKLER, 2007; 
REDMOND and SPENCER, 2012; WRIGHT, 1977, 2006). Limits on administrative 
control over such bigger political units and the dialectics of expansion and overreach 
produced cycles of expansion and contraction, (de-) or (re-)territorialization. A similar 
logic is reflected in maritime empires, albeit with different kinds of economic and 
political bases that reflect their emergence from controlling flows of goods, capital, and 
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people rather than controlling territory (MÜNKLER, 2007). On the co-existence of 
different forms of rule (on the interaction of maritime empires, land-based states, and 
overseas trading companies, see PHILLIPS and SHARMAN, 2015; on trading 
companies, see als STERN, 2011). 
 
Control over land was also central to the feudal era but the latter rested on a tangled 
patchwork of partly overlapping or superimposed territories, ‘in which different juridical 
instances were geographically interwoven and stratified, and plural allegiances, 
asymmetrical suzerainties and anomalous enclaves abounded’ (BEAULAC, 2004, p. 
189; cf. ELDEN, 2013, p. 5). Modern parallels include enclaves and exclaves and the 
claim of superpowers to extra-territorial rights in and over other states (e.g., spheres 
of influence, a Schmittian Großraum, the US ‘empire of bases’, see COHEN, 2015; 
SCHMITT, 2003; JOHNSON, 2000) as well as other privileges that weaken national 
sovereignty. Non-Westphalian modes also include principalities, city-states, 
absolutism, formal empires, suzerainty, tributary relations, warlordism, vassal or client 
states, modern imperial-colonial blocs, and colonies (BRAUDEL, 1975; DODGSHON, 
1987; ANDERSON, 1996). Further, some forms of political power are only loosely 
related to tightly demarcated territory. They include network governance, governance 
without government, charismatic rule, transnational religious authority like the Vatican 
or Islamic ummah, informal empires, or self-governing consociations of communities. 
 
New expressions of statehood are also said to be emerging. These include, rightly or 
wrongly, the re-emergence of empire as an organizing principle (BURBANK and 
COOPER, 2010; MÜNKLER, 2007), networks of world cities as a new form of 
Hanseatic League, the revival of subnational regions as key economic and political 
players (OHMAE, 1995), cross-border regional cooperation, a new medievalism 
(ANDERSON, 1996; FRIEDRICHS, 2001), supranational blocs, a global state or, at 
least, a western conglomerate state (SHAW, 2000), and an embryonic world state – 
or even global governance – that is oriented to securing perpetual peace (WENDT, 
2003). Added complications come, as we shall see, from competing accounts of the 
internal political configuration of the European Union (as opposed to the form and 
modalities of its external power projection) as a rescaled ‘national’ state, a neo-
medieval revival of the medieval political patchwork (WÆVER, 1997), a post-modern 
medieval political system (ZIELONKA, 2006), a Westphalian superstate, a 
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consociation (SCHMITTER, 1996), a networked polity (ANSELL, 2000), a network 
state (CASTELLS, 2000), a post-hegemonic empire (BECK and GRANDE, 2007). 
 
This discussion indicates that, besides the connection between a territory, a state 
apparatus, and a population, states have other spatial aspects. The latter comprise 
their roles in place building and place connection; in organizing and reorganizing the 
scalar division of labour; and in (meta-)governing networks. This is even clearer when 
we examine non-statal forms of exercising political authority. For example, in contrast 
to the ideal-typical modern state, an empire (not to be confused with imperialism) 
governs several relatively distinct territorially-defined political jurisdictions that are 
organized in the shadow of one centre with prerogatives over assets, policies, or 
activities that are superior to those of other jurisdictions (COLOMBI, 2004; BURBANK 
and COOPER, 2010; FINER, 1997a). Whereas states deploy hierarchical authority at 
different scales with a view to integrating the territory under its control; an empire seeks 
to accumulate power and resources by governing flows and networks among places 
in more complex, fractal forms of centre-periphery relations with boundaries that are 
less well defined and more permeable than those of state (ZIELONKA, 2006). By the 
same token, the terrestrial (broadly defined) is not only subject to territorialization but 
also to place-making, scaling processes, and reticulation. This is a crucial issue for 
political geography because, although the territorialization of political power is one of 
the state’s three defining features, it does not follow that this is the most important 
aspect of its socio-spatial organization – especially if one considers what happens 
within a state’s territorial boundaries rather than focusing on their constitution (cf. 
AGNEW, 2013 on place, space and territoriality as a compound theoretical lens to 
study politics and governance). Territory, place, scale, and network are also the 
elements in the TPSN schema (JESSOP, BRENNER and JONES, 2008; JONES and 
JESSOP, 2010; JESSOP and JONES, 2016). In these terms, the relative weight and 
overall articulation of these dimensions provides another way to describe and 
differentiate state forms and political regimes (see below). 
 
States also have temporal moments. These include specific temporal metrics and 
intertemporal linkages and have their own discursive, strategic, and material 
temporalities, their own temporal horizons of action, and their logistical implications 
(see, for example, DEIBERT, 1999; EKENGREN, 2002; SCHEUERMAN, 1998). In 
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addition to their current space-time coordinates, they have path-dependent spatio-
temporal legacies and future spatio-temporal horizons of action. Further, they have 
their own internal and interiorized spatio-temporalities, which depend in part on the 
linkages between the spatio-temporal features of the state in its narrow sense and 
those of the social order in which they are embedded. For example, as the world 
market becomes more integrated, the state’s spatial matrix and horizons of action 
typically change in response to challenges to its territorial sovereignty. Likewise, with 
the general trend towards social acceleration, the state’s temporal sovereignty is being 
threatened. This creates pressures to speed up political and policy routines, leading 
to ‘fast policy’ (PECK and THEODORE, 2015), which has its own dynamic compared 
with more normal political routines. Conversely, states and state power have 
spatiotemporal effects on other institutional orders and everyday life; and the impact 
of state activities, successful or not, spreads out in space and time, with potentially 
path-shaping effects. Combining socio-spatial and socio-temporal aspects of the state 
(in short, spatio-temporal aspects) is useful for analysing institutional fixes, 
spatiotemporal fixes, contradictions in particular socio-spatial configurations, socio-
spatial strategic contexts, and transformative strategies. 
 
Drawing on these arguments, the following four-component definition is useful: 
 
The core of the state apparatus comprises a relatively unified ensemble of 
socially embedded, socially regularized, and strategically selective institutions 
and organizations [Staatsgewalt] whose socially accepted function is to define 
and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society 
[Staatsvolk] in a given territorial area [Staatsgebiet] in the name of the common 
interest or general will of an imagined political community identified with that 
territory [Staatsidee]. (JESSOP, 2015: 49) 
 
This definition permits a strategic-relational analysis of state power (JESSOP, 2007) 
that is sensitive to the interaction of the various structural components of the state with 
political imaginaries and state projects as mediated through the balance of forces. 
Seen in these terms, the preceding account must be qualified in three respects. First, 
as an ensemble of power centres and capacities that offer unequal chances to different 
forces within and outside the state, the state itself does not exercise power. For, 
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second, its powers are activated by changing sets of politicians and officials in specific 
sites, acting in specific conjunctures, using specific modes of governance and specific 
horizons of action. Thus, to talk of the state or its managers exercising power is a 
convenient fiction that masks more complex political relations that extend well beyond 
the state system and its capacities. And, third, as a social relation (more precisely, as 
an institutionally-mediated condensation of a shifting balance of forces located within 
the state, the wider political system, and the wider sets of social relations within which 
the state is embedded, it involves far more than the state in its narrow, juridico-political 
sense. This is reflected in the expanded, or integral, definition of the state, proposed 
by GRAMSCI, which points beyond the state apparatus and political society to the 
dependence of state power on civil society (1975, Q6, §88; and below). 
 
Polity, Politics, and Policy 
 
We can develop this analysis through the conceptual triplet of polity, politics, and 
policy, which highlights the ontological depth of the political field (HEIDENHEIMER, 
1986; JESSOP, 2014). The nature of the polity affects capacities to engage in politics 
and this in turn constrains feasible policies (policy-making as art of the possible). Yet 
some policies transform politics (witness the depoliticizing aim of neoliberal policies or 
the politicizing effects of the feminist claim that the personal is political) with 
consequences for the architecture of the polity and/or reshape political practices (e.g., 
changing the balance of forces and stimulating new political claims and movements). 
 
Polity is a spatial concept demarcating the sphere of political activities from other 
spheres; related metaphors include domain, realm, field, area, arena, stage, scene, 
and site (PALONEN, 2006). It covers the institutional architecture of the political field, 
including its boundaries and boundary-maintenance activities vis-à-vis non-political 
spheres, and their asymmetric effects on political practice. This implies two forms of 
depoliticization of the polity (as opposed to politics or policy): depolitization and/or 
destatization. The former redraws the boundaries between the political and other fields 
to locate social relations and/or sets of social issues outside the political field. The 
latter removes issues from the formal purview of a territorial state – whether this occurs 
through electoral politics, legislative deliberation, executive decision, bureaucratic 
administration, or judicial determination – and moves them into an ill-defined political 
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sphere where diverse interests may contest how to define and govern them. This 
preserves a space for ‘politics without (official) policy-making’ and has recently been 
described as a movement from government to governance (see below). In this sense, 
in the modern state, governance straddles the conventional public-private divide and 
may involve 'tangled hierarchies', parallel power networks, or other linkages across 
tiers of government and/or functional domains. The implications of these phenomena 
for governance, governance failure, and metagovernance are explored below. 
 
Politics refers to formally instituted, organized or informal practices that are directly 
oriented to, or otherwise shape, the exercise of state power. In contrast to the 
presumed relative stability of the polity as an instituted space in this conceptual triplet, 
politics refers to dynamic, contingent activities that take time. They may occur within 
the formal political sphere, at its margins, or beyond it. Relevant political activities 
range from practices to transform the scope of the political sphere, define the state’s 
nature and purposes, modify the institutional integration and operating unity of the 
state, exercise direct control over the use of state powers, influence the balance of 
forces inside the state, block or resist the exercise of state power from ‘outside’, or 
modify the wider balance of forces that shapes politics as the art of the possible. 
 
Lastly, policy concerns the overall strategic line of a state, the changing responsibilities 
of branches and tiers of government, specific modes and fields of state intervention 
and non-intervention, the aims and content of particular decisions and non-decisions, 
and so on. All three Ps have institutional (structural) and practical (strategic) features 
that also interact with each other (for discussion, see JESSOP 2002, 2007, 2014; also 
BRAND, 2013 on historical materialist policy analysis). 
 
Government and Governance 
 
Combining Gramscian and Foucauldian perspectives with the polity-politics-policy 
distinction, I suggest that state power can be analysed as ‘government + governance 
in the shadow of hierarchy’. This reinterprets Gramsci’s proposition ‘that the state = 
“political society + civil society”, in other words, hegemony armoured by the protection 
of coercion’ (GRAMSCI 1975, Q6, §88, pp. 763–4). It shifts attention from the state as 
a juridico-political apparatus formally at the heart of the polity to the various modalities 
11 
 
of state power considered in broader, integral terms. This shift also requires attention 
to politics and policy. Overall, this reinterpretation implies that state power: (1) extends 
beyond coercion, imperative coordination and positive law to include other ways in 
which the state can mobilize active consent or passive compliance from forces situated 
and/or operating beyond the state in its narrow juridico-political sense; and (2) includes 
efforts by the state to strategically rebalance modes of government and governance – 
including their spatiotemporal aspects – to improve the effectiveness of direct and 
indirect direct state intervention in and across different social fields. 
 
I discussed aspects of government above and here I consider governance and, from 
a Foucauldian perspective, governmentality. Interest in governance revived in the 
1980s thanks to an alleged shift from government to governance. This was also the 
time when Foucault sought to ‘behead the king’ by diverting attention from the state 
as a sovereign authority to the complex forms and modalities of its role in the strategic 
codification of power relations in specific social formations (FOUCAULT, 1980, 2007, 
2008). In this context he studied governmentality through the triple optic of the 
urgences (social problems, crises, emergencies), discourses, and dispositifs (or 
apparatuses) that together create and temporarily stabilize sets of social relations at 
various scales, from the micro-level (the microphysics of power) through to larger scale 
phenomena (including the global spread of neoliberalism). Foucault’s work, although 
not always interpreted in terms of these three interrelated concerns, has been 
increasingly prominent in political economy and geography, as it has been elsewhere, 
but often to the neglect of its relation to the state, state power, and state effects. 
 
General studies identify three or four modes of governance: ex post co-ordination 
through exchange (e.g., the anarchy of the market), ex ante co-ordination through 
imperative co-ordination (e.g., the hierarchy of the firm, organization, or state), 
reflexive self-organization (e.g., the heterarchy of ongoing negotiated consent to 
resolve complex problems in a corporatist order or horizontal networking to co-ordinate 
a complex division of labour), and, less routinely, solidarity based on unconditional 
commitment to others (e.g., loyalty within small communities or local units or across 
imagined communities in times of crisis). More detailed research has identified many 
additional forms of governance and examined specific practices or regimes oriented 
to specific objects of governance, linked either to the planning, programming, and 
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regulation of particular policy fields or to issues of economic performance. Within the 
political field, however, attention often focused on the shift from government to 
governance, that is, the growing importance at various scales of networking, 
negotiation, and public-private partnerships (e.g., HARVEY, 1986; SWYNGEDOUW, 
2005). Further, reflecting in part Foucault’s work, attention also turned to the wide 
range of governance mechanisms, only some of which are grounded in the state, 
especially one regarded as sovereign in its territory and vis-à-vis other states. In these 
terms, pursuit of state projects involves not only mobilization of state capacities unique 
to the state in its narrow sense (e.g., a legitimate monopoly of organized coercion, tax 
powers, and legal sovereignty) and modes of governance or governmentalization such 
as the market, dialogue, and solidarity that operate beyond the state. 
 
Metagovernance in the Shadow of Hierarchy 
 
While the significance of governance and governmentality was soon affirmed in the 
geographical literature, metagovernance was discovered somewhat later. This term is 
obviously supervenient on governance and refers to the governance of governance. 
This may occur in response to the tendency of all forms of governance and associated 
policies to fail (market failure, state failure, network failure, or collapse in trust), leading 
to attempts to redesign them; or it may occur because certain social forces wish to 
rebalance modes of governance. Metagovernance occurs at many sites and scales as 
governance problems or the shifting balance of forces prompt efforts to improve 
governance or change its strategically selective impact on ideal and material interests. 
 
Nonetheless governments tend to intervene in metagovernance in areas of societal 
significance, whether these are formally private or public. They get involved in 
redesigning markets, in constitutional change and the juridical re-regulation of 
organizational forms and objectives, in organizing the conditions for networked self-
organization, in promoting social capital and the self-regulation of the professions and 
other forms of expertise, and, most importantly, in the collibration of different modes 
of governance and first-order metagovernance (i.e., redesign of individual dispositifs 
or particular modes of governance). This is especially true in periods of serious crisis 




More specifically, governments provide the ground rules for governance and the 
regulatory order in and through which governance partners can pursue their aims; 
ensure the compatibility or coherence of different governance mechanisms and 
regimes; create forums for dialogue and/or act as the primary organizer of the dialogue 
among policy communities; deploy a relative monopoly of organizational intelligence 
and information in order to shape cognitive expectations; serve as a 'court of appeal' 
for disputes arising within and over governance; seek to re-balance power differentials 
and strategic bias in regimes by strengthening weaker forces or systems in the 
interests of system integration and/or social cohesion; take material and/or symbolic 
flanking and supporting measures to stabilize forms of coordination that are deemed 
valuable but prone to collapse; subsidize production of public goods; organize side-
payments for those making sacrifices to facilitate effective coordination; contribute to 
the meshing of short-, medium- and long-term time horizons and temporal rhythms 
across various sites, scales, and actors, in part to prevent opportunistic exit and entry 
into governance arrangements; try to modify the self-understanding of identities, 
strategic capacities, and interests of individual and collective actors in diverse strategic 
contexts and so alter their import for preferred strategies and tactics; organize 
redundancies and duplication to sustain resilience via requisite variety in response to 
unexpected problems; and also assume political responsibility as addressee in last 
resort in the event of governance failure in domains beyond the state (based in part 
on JESSOP, 2002). Such collibratory practices suggest that governance (in its various 
forms) occurs ‘in the shadow of hierarchy' (SCHARPF, 1994, p. 40). In other words, 
there is a continuing role for the state in the organization of self-organization as well 
as other modes of governance (see also BEVIR, 2010; MEULEMAN, 2008). Indeed, 
for BELL and HINDMOOR (2009), metagovernance is the government of governance. 
 
While these remarks highlight the state’s role in collibration, other scholars have 
identified functional equivalents to the state’s ‘shadow’ role in this regard. These 
include: (1) the more or less spontaneous, bottom-up development by networks of 
rules, values, norms and principles that they then acknowledge and follow (KOOIMAN 
and JENTOFT, 2009; and TORFING, PETERS, PIERRE and SØRENSEN, 2012); (2) 
increased deliberation and participation by civil society groups through stakeholder 
democracy, putting external pressure on the state managers and/or other elites 
involved in governance (BEVIR, 2010); and (3) actions taken by international 
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governmental and non-governmental agencies to compensate for the inability of failed 
or weak states’ to engage in metagovernance (BÖRZEL and RISSE, 2010) – although 
this third case seems to involve a rescaling of the shadow of hierarchy insofar as these 
actions are typically backed, as BÖRZEL and RISSE concede, by powerful states. 
 
Moreover, because governance and government mechanisms co-exist in a complex 
sociospatial matrix, success in regard to political redesign, politics, or policies in one 
dimension of this matrix may depend on practices and events in other dimensions. 
Different government and governance mechanisms may also have different temporal 
horizons with a corresponding potential for disjunctions that may undermine the 
viability of any given mechanism. Poul Fritz KJAER (2010) notes a further paradox 
that, in the EU, government and governance are mutually constitutive such that more 
governing implies more governance and vice versa. In turn, Bengt LARSSON 
suggests that, whereas the state can enhance its power by using networks to govern, 
networks depend on sovereign power to maintain the conditions for effective network 
governance (LARSSON, 2013). These comments focus mainly on the formal 
organizational and institutional features of governance and government. They deserve 
to be elaborated in the light of the socio-spatial arguments outlined above. 
 
Building on these ideas, we might argue that governance (in its narrow sense of 
networking, negotiation, etc.) and metagovernance depend on the organization of 
reflexive self-organization among multiple stakeholders across several scales of state 
territorial organization and, indeed, in diverse extra-territorial contexts. In this context, 
the state’s role (at any scale) is that of primus inter pares in a complex, heterogeneous, 
and multilevel network rather than that of the sovereign authority in a single 
hierarchical command structure and its primary contribution is as one actor-cum-
stakeholder among others than can contribute distinctive resources to governance 
arrangements and projects that may originate beyond the state. In this context, formal 
sovereignty is better seen as a series of symbolic and material state capacities than 
as an overarching, dominant resource. Other stakeholders contribute other symbolic 
or material resources (e.g., private money, legitimacy, information, expertise, 
organizational capacities, or the power of numbers) to be combined with states’ 
sovereign and other capacities to advance collectively agreed (or accepted) aims and 
objectives. Thus states’ involvement in multilevel governance thereby becomes less 
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hierarchical, less centralized, and less directive and, compared to the clear hierarchy 
of territorial powers theoretically associated with sovereign states, it typically involves 
tangled hierarchies and complex interdependence. 
 
Three further sets of remarks will help to put governance and metagovernance in their 
place within a strategic-relational approach. First, governance is certainly not a purely 
technical matter limited to specific problems defined by the state (or other social 
forces) that can be solved by experts in organizational design, public administration, 
and public opinion management. This is not only because of the ‘wicked problems’ 
generated by a complex world but also because governance (and, a fortiori, meta-
governance) practices involve not only specific political and/or policy outcomes in 
particular political and policy fields but also have broader effects on state capacities. 
They modify the available mix of government and governance techniques and change 
the balance of forces. Indeed, those engaged in metagovernance may redraw the 
inherited public-private divide, alter the forms of interpenetration between the political 
system and other functional systems, and modify the relations between these systems 
and civil society in the light of their (perceived) impact on state capacities. 
 
Second, while collibration is a core meta-political activity of states, an activity where it 
has a privileged strategic position, it is often hotly contested because of competing 
meta-governance projects. More generally, the state reserves to itself the right to 
open, close, juggle, and re-articulate governance not only in terms of particular 
functions but also from the viewpoint of partisan and global political advantage. This 
is related in the last resort to the declaration of states of emergency, which give 
extraordinary powers to state officials to reorder government and governance 
arrangements. Even in less extreme situations, this can often lead to self-interested 
action on the part of state managers to protect their particular interests rather than to 
preserve the state's overall capacity to pursue an (always selective and biased) 
consensual interpretation of the public interest and to promote social cohesion. 
 
Third, Claus Offe once noted that modes of policy-making are better for some 
purposes than others and that, as policy objectives change, so would the best mode 
(OFFE, 1975). Nonetheless even appropriate forms have their own problems and 
generate others in turn. Offe asked how the state apparatus survives in the face of 
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these tendencies towards policy and state failure. His answer was that it does so 
through a continual fuite en avant, i.e., it escapes from an emerging crisis in one mode 
of policy-making by moving to another that is also likely to fail. His argument can be 
extended, as I argue below, to modes of governance and, hence, to the need for 
specific institutional and spatio-temporal fixes that provide temporary, provisional, and 
partial solutions to these challenges. But first I will consider the implications of these 
arguments for the study of multilevel government and governance. 
 
Multilevel Governance or Multispatial Metagovernance? 
 
The complexities of the EU as a state and/or empire in the process of formation have 
prompted a proliferation of descriptions of its emerging form, some of which question 
its character as a territorial state. Besides its treatment as a supranational state, there 
are three other prominent descriptions: (1) a site of intergovernmental relations and 
negotiation; (2) network governance or network polity; and (3) multilevel government 
or governance. Each concept has its own theoretical problems and, in addition, even 
where a particular concept pertains to observable trends and underlying tendencies, 
its scope is limited because EU government and governance arrangements are 
multidimensional and polycentric, encompassing many kinds of political, legal, social 
and executive actors (ESPON 2013) and many modes of government and 
governance. These operate along and across regional, national and supranational 
levels of authority. In addition, the novelty of spatial governance in Europe and its 
crucial role in the ongoing, trial-and-error process of state- and/or empire-building has 
led to a proliferation of new spatial concepts, new spatial imaginaries, and new spatial 
projects (cf. ALLMENDINGER, CHILLA AND SIELKER 2014; LUUKKONEN 2015). 
 
The claim that the European Union is like a territorial state that has been rescaled to 
a supranational level is implausible. So is the claim that it is but one (perhaps major) 
site for intergovernmental relations and negotiation. Indeed, developments in the EU, 
especially around the Eurozone and refugee crises, show the limits of both accounts. 
Thus we observe, inter alia, a new political axis based on Franco-German interest in 
keeping the Eurozone intact with decisions being imposed on weaker member states 
(notably Cyprus and Greece but also Portugal and Italy). And, conversely, we see an 
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alliance of Northern European Union states with strong economies against Southern 
Europe (including here France). The weakness of the supranational and 
intergovernmental approaches and the obvious asymmetries in the power and 
influence of European Union member states (casting doubt on the network polity 
approach) helps to explain why multilevel government or governance became the 
leading approach for studying European integration (HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001; 
BACHE and FLINDERS, 2004; BACHE, 2008, 2010; on the more general challenge 
of marked asymmetries to the network governance, see DAVIES, 2011). 
 
Initial work on multilevel government highlighted how power and decision-making in 
the EU seemed to be shifting from a hierarchical system of government based on 
imperative coordination towards ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested 
governments at several territorial tiers’ (MARKS, 1993, p. 392). This was then 
extended to include non-state actors, for which the term multilevel governance seems 
more appropriate (ALCANATARA et al., 2015; PIATTONI, 2010). Later work multiplied 
the levels included and emphasized the blurring of the private-public distinction or of 
that between state and ‘civil society’ (itself a polyvalent and vague term). 
 
Research on multilevel government and governance is still strongly associated with 
the study of the EU, with other studies modelled on this paradigmatic field. Much 
work involves taxonomic refinement (for example, confederal, federal and unitary 
forms or the types of non-state actor engaged at different scales) and the fine-
tuning of case studies of specific policy fields. Thus there is less concern with 
developing explanatory arguments that go beyond noting the sheer complexity of 
governance issues or the complex reciprocal interdependence among different 
kinds of actors at different levels. Nor is there much effort to disambiguate ‘level’ 
so that it is clear whether it refers to territorial jurisdictions, core-periphery relations 
among places, the scalar division of labour (with its potentially tangled hierarchies), 
the nodal character of networks, and so on (see below). 
 
Efforts at European integration over some 250 years – and not just during the period 
of post-war European integration – illustrate the trial-and-error nature of government 
and governance design and policy learning. This is especially clear since the 1950s. 
Indeed, the EU is now widely regarded as the world’s leading experimental site in 
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multilevel government and/or governance and in attempts to overcome its crisis-
tendencies (COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, 2009b; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
2001, 2014). These attempts in Europe and elsewhere reflect, inter alia, the growing 
disjunction in integrated regional and global economies between the formal structures 
of political power associated with sovereign territorial states and the substantive 
circuits of economic flows and transnational power. Where government is based on 
territorial representation, it is challenged by the relativization of scale (a loss of primacy 
of the national scale), by de- and re-territorialization (the territorial re-scaling of 
government powers and authorities), and the resulting increase in variable geometries 
and tangled hierarchies of political power (the loss of territorial congruence and/or of 
neatly nested hierarchies of power across a growing range of fields of government 
action). We also observe challenges to the traditional bases of national citizenship and 
mutual solidarity in some states thanks to multi-ethnicity, multiculturalism, and divided 
political loyalties. Moreover, with growing interdependence among functional systems 
with their own operational codes, logics of appropriateness, temporalities, spatialities, 
etc., it gets harder for one system (even the state as the core of the political system) 
to control the operations of other systems or institutional orders from outside and 
above them. 
 
The development of the constitutional and political (polity) arrangements in the EU is 
a reflexive process, with convention working groups, intergovernmental conferences, 
other contested metaconstitutional debates and continued calls for critical self-
reflexion and resilience. This reflects MONNET’s (1976) remark that ‘Europe will be 
forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises’. The 
European Parliament resolved in 2008 to strengthen multilevel governance (MLG) 
urgently; José Manuel BARROSO claimed in 2009 that MLG was vital to the EU’s 
competitive edge and that, in the prevailing economic crisis, its further development 
was a priority (cited in COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, 2009a); this same Committee 
also published the White Paper on Multilevel Governance, which envisages 
governance systems that involve regional and local authorities in formulating and 
implementing Community policies (COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2009b). Such 
developments, marked by varying degrees of self-criticism and reflexivity, indicate the 
relevance of the concept of metagovernance to the institutions and practices of MLG 
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in the European Union. This was reflected in the concepts of multilevel 
metagovernance (JESSOP, 2004) and multiscalar metagovernance (JESSOP, 2007). 
For the EU can be seen as a major and, indeed, increasingly important, supranational 
instance of meta-governance in relation to a wide range of complex and interrelated 
problems. 
 
Returning to the initial concept, Gary MARKS, who pioneered the MLG paradigm, 
defined it as ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at 
several territorial tiers’ and noted that ‘supranational, national, regional, and local 
governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks’ (MARKS, 
1993, pp. 402-3). This indicates some problems with early formulations of the term:  
(1) it focuses on vertical nested tiers of territorial political authority and neglects other 
socio-spatial structuring principles; (2) it is often confined to EU member and candidate 
states and neglects the role of other states and international institutions; (3) it ignores 
the space of flows, a major source of governance problems; (4) it reifies scale and 
ignores tangled scalar hierarchies; and (5) it ignores evidence of incoherence, mutual 
contradictions, etc. (see BACHE and FLINDERS, 2004; HENDERSON, JEFFERY, 
WINCOTT and JONES, 2013; JESSOP, 2007; PIATTONI, 2009; STUBBS, 2005). 
 
The first problem was partially resolved by including horizontal linkages (such as 
cross-border regions) into the set of jurisdictions but the focus on territorial government 
often remained, which explains why concepts, such as network polity, are proposed 
as complements or rivals to MLG. The second problem is partly resolved when 
attention turns to the integration of the EU into wider European economic space, the 
near neighbourhood, the Eurasian region, the Middle East and North Africa, or the 
Transatlantic region. But this maintains a Eurocentric focus and tends to neglect the 
extent to which other states and international institutions are key players in MLG in the 
EU itself. This is a special challenge regarding the range of institutions involved in 
managing the Eurozone crisis, which, as well as member states and the Troika, 
includes the United States, other international financial institutions, and other key 
stakeholders. There are many similar cases that vary by problem and policy area. 
 
Third, the contrasting logics of territorialization and space of flows are also deeply 
problematic for government and governance and its analysis. This issue is sometimes 
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related to complex interdependence to justify the need for intergovernmental relations 
and/or MLG but this justification underplays the complexities of governing the space 
of flows as well as to problems grounded in other kinds of spatial dynamics. Indeed, 
because the sources and reach of these problems go well beyond the territorial space 
of its member states, multilevel government and/or governance cannot be fully 
understood without considering their complex relations with other nodes located 
above, below, and transversal to the EU. Each scale and node is involved in complex, 
tangled relations with others located above, below, or transversal thereto and many 
parallel power networks are also involved in their coordination and collibration. Indeed, 
while one might well suggest that the European scale is becoming increasingly 
dominant within the EU’s multispatial metagovernance regime, it is merely nodal in the 
emerging multispatial metagovernance regimes that are developing on a global scale 
in the shadow of (an increasingly crisis-prone) the United States. This argument 
indicates the need to look beyond the territory of the EU and/or its internal scalar 
division to study networks that cross-cut territorial boundaries and are transversal to 
specific scalar hierarchies, whether neatly nested or twisted and tangled. 
 
Revisiting the TPSN Schema 
 
These brief remarks indicate that the challenge of effective European Union 
government and/or governance is not just one of redesigning the polity, organizing 
politics, or formulating and implementing policies on two or more levels (whether 
understood in terms of nested areas or scalar hierarchies). Similar problems also exist 
in federal states – and, indeed, have led some scholars to model the challenges in EU 
politics on similar lines (e.g., SCHARPF, 1988 on the joint-decision trap). A more 
fundamental problem is that the challenges of EU governance also involve territory, 
place, and network – as, indeed, do other kinds of polity, politics, and policy. The 
reference here is to the territory-place-scale-network (or TPSN) schema developed by 
JESSOP, BRENNER and JONES (2008). This schema explores the interaction 
between these four spatial moments of social relations considered both as structuring 
principles and as fields of socio-spatial organization. These moments of socio-
spatiality can be combined to produce more concrete–complex analyses of particular 
socio-spatial configurations, tied to specific substantive relations and processes, and 




Overall, building on my earlier remarks on space as a site, object, and means of social 
practices (including government and governance), a brief reflection on this two-
dimensional matrix (see Table 1) suggests that: 
 
(1) Different TPSN configurations could be the site for elaborating spatio-temporal 
strategies and fixes, that is, sites where strategies and fixes are elaborated and 
pursued (e.g., states, land-based empires, global city networks, virtual regions 
such as the Four Motors Region or the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) 
economies; cf. on bounded territories, networked territories, fluid territories, see 
JAUHIAINEN and MOILANEN, 2011; and on territory, place, and network in the 
new regionalism, see HARRISON, 2010). 
 
(2) They could be the object of spatio-temporal strategies and fixes, that is, 
themselves be the object of recalibration, reorganization, collibration, and so forth 
– either in their actually existing form (e.g., spatial rebalancing, MARTIN, 2015, 
creating soft spaces with fuzzy boundaries to aid metagovernance, 
ALLMENDINGER and HAUGHTON 2009; or refocusing on territorial governance 
in the modern metropolis, SCHINDLER, 2015) or as potential objects yet to be 
formed (e.g., the development of ‘soft spaces’ in Danish spatial planning, OLESEN 
2012; or the halting movement of the BRIC economies from an asset class for 
investment to an emerging transnational economic bloc and intergovernmental 
regime, SUM, 2013). 
 
(3) They could have different roles as means in securing, modifying, or disrupting 
the coherence of spatiotemporal relations in social formations in different stages 
of development, historical contexts, and specific conjunctures (e.g., promoting 
cluster policies as part of a knowledge-based economy strategy, GU and 
LUNDVALL, 2006; or introducing inter-urban competition as part of neoliberal 
projects to weaken spatial Keynesianism, BRENNER, 2004). 
 
(4) The relative significance of territory, place, scale, and networks as structuring 
principles for sociospatial relations is likely to vary with types of institutional and 
spatiotemporal fix and hence to be reflected in efforts to secure the overall 
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coherence of social relations in a given spatiotemporal envelope (e.g., the relative 
primacy of territory and place in Atlantic Fordism versus the relative primacy of 
scale and network in an emerging transnational post-Fordist economy based on 
flexible accumulation, JESSOP, 2002). 
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Source: greatly modified version of Table 2 in JESSOP et al., 2008 
 
(5) Strategies of crisis resolution could involve attempts to reorder the relative 
importance of the four dimensions and their associated institutional expressions 
and, hence, to modify the weight of their role in displacing crisis tendencies and 





(6) Crises, attempts at crisis resolution, and the emergence of new spatiotemporal 
fixes may lead to shifts in the most effective (imagined) sociospatial bases, 
organizational structures, and strategies for sub- or counter-hegemonic projects 
(e.g., the social economy, the Occupy movement) (e.g., AMIN, CAMERON and 
HUDSON, 2002; ANTENTAS, 2015; CALHOUN, 2013). 
 
Viewed in these terms, the concept of MLG ignores many other ways of approaching 
governance (based on other sociospatial structuring principles) and other kinds of 
socio-spatial governance problems (each with its own more or less distinct spatio-
temporal as well as substantive features), especially those generated by the specificity 
of place and the space of flows rather than by issues of territoriality or scale. Problems 
that are revealed through the use of the TPSN schema include: the growing 
disjuncture between ‘fixed’ national territory and global flows; destabilization due to 
increasing uneven spatial development among places and their role in political-
economic crisis generation; the increasing significance of sub- and supra-national 
scales of political-economic organization; and the proliferation of networks that are 
neither co-extensive nor isomorphic to national territories. 
 
The limited descriptive and explanatory scope of the MLG concept can be seen from 
the fact that it occupies just two cells in the sixteen-cell two-dimensional TPSN table 
– those concerned with territorial ordering along scalar lines and the (re-)scaling of 
territorial relations. Its narrow scope compared with the potential range of forms of 
socio-spatial governance, especially once one goes beyond two-dimensions to more 
complex sociospatial configurations, also shows the limits of the alternative concept 
of multiscalar metagovernance. For, while it transcends government and governance, 
it merely substitutes scale for level as the site of relevant metagovernance practices. 
 
This suggests that multilevel government and/or governance should be put in their 
place within a broader multispatial metagovernance approach and that its agents 
should therefore be related not only to their position in a scalar division of labour but 
also in territorial, place-based, and network-mediated forms and modes of agency. In 
practice, it must be conceded, much work that is presented under the rubric of MLG 
(whether the third letter in the acronym is interpreted as government or governance) 
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does take account of at least some of these complexities, either theoretically or, more 
often, when presenting its findings. In this sense the MLG approach is a misleading 
and oversimplified self-designation of work in this field and this partly accounts for the 
growing body of work intended to clarify different meanings and dimensions of MLG 
(see, for example, HOOGHE and MARKS 2003, PIATTONI, 2010). An alternative 
strategy, with the benefit of highlighting what is actually at stake, is to propose a new 
term or rubric under which to explore these issues. 
 
I therefore propose the notion of multispatial metagovernance as an alternative 
approach to thinking about the issues addressed in the MLG literature and, indeed, to 
other issues of governing social relations marked by complex reciprocal 
interdependence across several spatio-temporal social fields. There are has four 
potential advantages over multilevel government, network governance, multilevel 
governance, and other widely used concepts. First, it affirms the irreducible plurality 
of territorial area, social scales, networks, and places that must be addressed in 
attempts at governance. In other words, it notes the complex interrelations between 
territorial organization, multiple scalar divisions of labour (and other practices), 
networked forms of social interaction, and the importance of place as a meeting point 
of functional operations and the conduct of personal life. Second, it recognizes the 
complex, tangled, and interwoven nature of the relevant political relations, which 
include important horizontal and transversal linkages – indicated in notions such as 
‘network state’ or ‘network polity’ – as well as the vertical linkages implied in multilevel 
government and/or governance. Third, in contrast to a one-sided emphasis on 
heterarchic coordination, it introduces metagovernance as the reflexive art of 
balancing government and other forms of governance to create requisite variety, 
flexibility, and adaptability in coordinated policy-formulation, policy-making, and 
implementation. Fourth, it insists on the plurality and, indeed, heterogeneity of actors 
potentially involved in such institutions and practices, which stretch well beyond 
different tiers of government and well beyond the confines of any given administrative, 
political, or economic space. 
 
Following Gramsci’s distinction between narrow and integral senses of ‘the state’ (see 
GRAMSCI, 1975 Q6 §155, Q17 §51, and Q6 §10) and my proposed redefinition of the 
state as ‘government + governance in the shadow of hierarchy’, we can also explore 
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their narrow and integral spatiotemporal dimensions and their implications for 
multispatial metagovernance. The narrow dimension refers to spatialities of the state 
regarded as an ensemble of juridico-political institutions and regulatory capacities 
grounded in the territorialization of political power. It includes the changing meaning 
and organization of state territoriality; the evolving role of borders, boundaries, and 
frontiers; and the changing intranational geographies of the state’s territorial 
organization and internal administrative differentiation (cf. BRENNER, 2004). Also 
included are the state’s roles in promoting, addressing, or reversing uneven 
development in the relation between places, in reorganizing its own internal scalar 
division of labour, and in managing networks within and beyond the state’s juridico- 
political apparatus. State space in its ‘broad’ or ‘integral’ sense denotes the wider 
sociospatial supports and implications of state space and the sociospatial embedding 
of particular TPSN configurations of the state apparatus and of state power. It covers 
the TPSN-specific ways in which state institutions are mobilized strategically to 
regulate, govern and reorganize social and economic relations and, more generally, 
the changing geographies of state intervention into social and economic processes. 
 
A related concept is state spatial strategies – again to be understood in integral terms 
à la Gramsci and/or in relation to ‘government + governance’. These strategies refer 
to the historically specific practices through which state (and imperial) institutions and 
state managers (and the social forces they represent) seek to reorder territories, 
places, scales, and networks to secure the reproduction of the state in its narrow 
sense, to reconfigure the sociospatial dimensions of the state in its integral sense, and 
to promote specific accumulation strategies, state projects, hegemonic visions, or 
other social imaginaries and projects. These strategies have important infrastructural 
as well as despotic dimensions (MANN, 1984), are related to specific spatiotemporal 
imaginaries, and depend on specific technologies and governmental practices 
(LEFEBVRE, 1991; PRESCOTT, 1987; HANNAH, 2000; BRENNER, 2004). Such 
strategies are important aspects of multispatial metagovernance (see below). 
 
Combining these arguments, it seems that ‘multispatial metagovernance’ needs even 
more serious disambiguation than multilevel government or governance. Specifically, 
multispatial can denote the site, the means, and the object of governance, first-order 
metagovernance (the redesign of a given mode of governance), and second-order 
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metagovernance (the judicious rebalancing of the relative weight of different modes of 
governing, or collibration) insofar as these practices are also oriented to shaping the 
socio-spatial dimensions of their respective objects. Thus all sixteen cells in Table 1 
can be seen as sites of government and governance, objects of government and 
governance, and means of government and governance. As such they can be used to 
plot trajectories in space-time and to identify alternative spatial strategies and fixes. 
More crucially, of course, these cells represent analytically distinct types of two-
dimensional socio-spatial configuration that will co-exist, often in hybrid or three- or 
four-dimensional forms in actual sociospatial worlds. Thus the governance of a specific 
space will involve more complex sociospatial configurations and this hugely multiplies 
the complexities of governance. In turn, in terms of metagovernance, we can envisage 
competing or rival sociospatial strategies that seek to rebalance the relative weight of 
the sociospatial configurations illustrated by the descriptions in these cells. 
 
Extending the TPSN Research Agenda by Revisiting Spatiotemporal Fixes 
 
Each socio-spatial organizing principle has its own forms of inclusion–exclusion and 
entails differential capacities to exercise state powers. This opens a strategic field in 
which social forces seek to privilege different modes of socio-spatial organization to 
privilege their ideal and material interests. Regarding the state in its narrow, juridico-
political sense, examples include gerrymandering constituency boundaries, voter 
suppression, promoting or weakening place-based uneven development and centre–
periphery inequalities, reordering scalar hierarchies and scale jumping, and organizing 
parallel power networks that cross-cut formal vertical and horizontal divisions of power 
within and beyond the state. 
 
Further, given the contradictions and dilemmas linked to basic structural forms (such 
as the capital relation) and with different socio-spatial forms, we might explore how 
these contradictions are managed through spatial displacement and/or temporal 
deferral of the direct and indirect costs of efforts to manage them. Two interrelated 
concepts that highlight the role of structure and strategy in these regards are those of 
institutional and spatiotemporal fixes. Neither is uniquely concerned with the polity and 
state powers. They are nonetheless fundamental features of the state in its narrow 
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and integral senses; and, in addition, the state system and the activation of state 
powers shape institutional and spatiotemporal fixes more generally. 
 
An institutional fix is a complementary set of institutions that, via institutional design, 
imitation, imposition, or chance evolution offer (within given parametric limits) a 
temporary, partial, and relatively stable solution to the coordination problems involved 
in securing economic, political, or social order. Nonetheless, it is not purely technical 
and, rather than providing a post hoc solution to pre-given coordination problems, it is 
partly constitutive of this order. It rests on an institutionalized, unstable equilibrium of 
compromise or, in extremis, an open use of force. Such a fix can also be examined as 
a spatiotemporal fix (or STF), and vice versa (the following definition differs from that 
offered by David HARVEY, 1982; see JESSOP, 2006). STFs set spatial and temporal 
boundaries within which the always relative, incomplete, and provisional structural 
coherence (and hence the institutional complementarities) of a given order are 
secured – in so far as ever occurs. One of their key contributions is to externalize the 
material and social costs of securing such coherence beyond the spatial, temporal, 
and social boundaries of the institutional fix by displacing or deferring them (or both) 
in more or less complex socio-spatial ways that can be analysed using the TPSN 
schema. Such fixes delimit the main spatial and temporal boundaries within which 
relative structural coherence is secured and displace certain costs of securing this 
coherence beyond these boundaries. The primary socio-spatial moments and 
temporal horizons around which fixes are built and their coherence vary widely over 
time. This is reflected in the variable coincidence of different boundaries, borders or 
frontiers of action and the changing primacy of different scales in complex 
configurations of territory-place-scale-network relations. 
 
Thus an important aspect of governance success (or, more precisely, conveying the 
impression thereof) is the discursive and institutional framing of specific STFs within 
which governance problems appear manageable because certain ungovernable 
features manifest themselves elsewhere. Two corollaries are that current zones of 
stability imply future zones of instability and that zones of stability in this place imply 
zones of instability in other places – including within a given zone of stability that is 
internally differentiated and stratified. Indeed, capacities to defer and displace 
problems was one source of ‘steering optimism’ in early governance and 
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metagovernance literatures – especially when reinforced by the ability to engage in a 
fuite en avant by producing new fixes to escape the consequences of past failures. 
Nonetheless, these fixes only appear to harmonize contradictions, which persist in one 
or another form. Such regimes are partial, provisional, and unstable and attempts to 
impose them can lead to various forms of ‘blowback’. 
In this context, to the extent that these fixes are oriented to specific contradictions and 
their associated dilemmas, these may be handled through 
 
 hierarchization: treat some contradictions as more important than others; 
 prioritization: give priority to one aspect of a contradiction or dilemma over the 
other aspect; 
 spatialization: rely on different territories, places, scales, and action networks to 
address one or another contradiction or aspect or to displace the problems 
associated with the neglected aspect to marginal or liminal territories, places, 
scales, or networks; and 
 temporalization: routinely treat one or other aspect of a contradiction in turn or 
focus one-sidedly on a subset of contradictions, dilemmas, or aspects until it 
becomes urgent to address what had hitherto been neglected (for further 
discussion, see JESSOP, 2013). 
 
While contradictions, dilemmas, and antagonisms cannot be reconciled permanently, 
they may be moderated – partially and provisionally – through mechanisms and 
projects that prioritize one aspect of a contradiction, one horn of a dilemma, or just 
some interests over others with resulting asymmetrical effects. This can be achieved 
‘ideally’, at least in the short run, by successfully presenting specific, necessarily 
selective solutions as the expression of an (always illusory) general interest. In other 
cases the ‘resolution’ will involve more visible, even forcible strategies and tactics. 
 
This is a contested process, involving different economic, political, and social forces 
and diverse strategies and projects and this, in turn, is one source of the instability of 
institutional and spatio-temporal fixes that are consolidated, if at all, only provisionally 
and partially and that are always the product of a temporary unstable equilibrium of 
compromise. It is also fractal. That is, at whatever scale of analysis we adopt, we find 
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competing, contrary, and contradictory attempts to establish organizational, 
institutional and spatio-temporal fixes on many sites, with alternative targets of 
government and/or governance, using different kinds and combinations of socio-
spatial organizing principles and strategies, intended to serve different kinds of ideal 
and material interests, and reflecting different sets of social forces. This poses a series 
of challenges, for those actors as well as observers, on how to reconcile micro-social 
diversity and a contingent macro-social order. If a strategic line rather than chaos can 
be discerned, this may be related to relatively successful meta-governance practices 
pursued in the context of specific institutional and spatiotemporal fixes that privilege 
some interests and strategies over others and, for a time, displace or defer the 
conflicts, contradictions, and crisis-tendencies associated with these fixes (for a case 





This article has employed the strategic-relational approach and the TPSN schema to 
develop a heuristic framework for exploring the articulation of territory, politics, and 
governance with the aid of a novel interpretation of state power as ‘government + 
governance in the shadow of hierarchy’. Among several theoretical and conceptual 
innovations associated with this approach, one of the most significant is the notion of 
multispatial metagovernance. As a concept that is supervenient on many others, 
MSMG (Multispatial metagovernance) highlights the complexity of issues that are 
often treated in oversimplified ways, even, indeed, against the rich empirical evidence 
studied under the rubric of multilevel governance. At this stage of meta-theoretical, 
theoretical, substantive, strategic, and policy elaboration, however, MSMG is mainly a 
place-holding concept that identifies a range of problems to be addressed in future 
research. 
 
First, regarding state theory, governmentality, and critical governance studies, the new 
approach suggests at least four areas for investigation. One is how to displace the 
Westphalian sovereign state as the focal point of state theory, drawing in particular on 
Gramscian and Foucauldian insights, to explore the diverse modalities of state power 
understood in its inclusive, or integral, sense. A related issue is how to move beyond 
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methodological territorialism in regard to the spatiality of the state and state power, 
drawing on an elaborated, multidimensional version of the TPSN schema to disclose 
and analyse the complexities of their sociospatial aspects. Another crucial issue is the 
explicit recognition in this approach of the possibility of government and governance 
failure, the significance in this context of different forms of metagovernance, and, 
especially, the role of multispatial metagovernance in efforts – themselves prone to 
failure – to rebalance different aspects of government and governance. Last, but not 
least, sociospatial relations are not merely the site of government, governance, and 
metagovernance but also objects and means of governance. This point serves to 
counteract the tendency to restrict MLG and analogous concepts to descriptors of the 
levels, scales or sites of politics and policy and to neglect how governance practices 
can also focus on efforts to recalibrate TPSN relations as a specific strategic 
object(ive) or, again, on attempts to reorder the strategic sociospatial selectivities of 
the polity, politics, and policy or other important fields of action. 
 
Second, regarding the European Union as a real-time laboratory for trial-and-error 
experimentation in governance, the MSMG approach helps to reveal the limits of the 
dominant approaches in terms of multilevel government, multilevel governance, and 
the network polity. This matters because, often against the thrust of associated 
empirical analyses, these approaches juxtapose hierarchical levels and/or horizontal 
networks rather than considering how they might be articulated and also neglect other 
and more complex forms of sociospatial organization. In addition, they tend to focus 
one-sidedly on levels and networks as sites of politics and policy to the neglect of 
sociospatial arrangements as objects and means of government and governance. This 
approach also indicates the need – theoretically, empirically, and strategically – to look 
beyond the supranational institutions of the European Union as the ‘peak’ level in 
multilevel governance to consider how the EU, considered as a heterogeneous 
ensemble of apparatuses, institutions, and discursive-material practices, is inserted 
into wider sets of government, governance and metagovernance relations across 
different sets of sociospatial relations. Relatedly, but conversely, one can explore how 
non-European political and non-political forces are always-already present inside the 
government, governance, and metagovernance arrangements of the EU considered 
as an evolving ensemble of government + governance in the shadow of hierarchy (this 




Third, given that this article draws on a plenary lecture sponsored by Territory, Politics, 
Governance and that it is inspired in part by its inaugural editorial statement, it is worth 
highlighting that this journal could offer a productive forum for exploring the potential 
of multispatial metagovernance as a theoretical approach and heuristic framework. As 
noted above, in important respects, this is a place-holding concept that identifies a set 
of problems rather than already resolving them. Its appeal is that it is part of a much 
broader conceptual toolbox that provides multiple entry points into ‘territorial politics, 
spaces of governance, and the political organization of space’ (AGNEW 2013, p. 1), 
indicates the many ways in which these substantive issues can be articulated, 
suggests further combinations of the three terms (as well as their further complication 
through different kinds of TPSN linkage), and, as a concept, is supervenient on a range 
of other concepts concerned with socio-spatial relations, government and governance, 
structures and strategies. Thus, rather than limiting discussion to taxonomic 
refinements, empirical extensions, and routine comparative studies based on the MLG 
paradigm, the approach suggested here opens the space for wide-ranging theoretical 
and empirical debates about the future of territory, politics, governance with obvious 
relevance to MLG but with far broader implications for the pursuit and further 
elaboration of the journal’s original mission. 
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